To what extent do existing theories of civil-military relations apply in states with particular historical, ideological, social, and cultural contexts?

Western theories of civil-military relations seem to apply quite well to Malawi during its first decade of independence. However, quite likely, this is a result of heavy British influence prior to independence, as well as the fact that the military of the newly independent Malawi was not much different from the colonial military. In fact, all senior officers of the ‘new’ army were still of white, British ancestry (Mandiza, 2002). Either way, the military of the newly independent Malawi remained politically neutral, even in the face of political turmoil (Mandiza, 2002), since it apparently desired to continue to follow British traditions and be under objective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). However, the first president of the newly independent Malawi, surnamed Banda, had trouble dealing with his political opponents, and desired political support from some kind of a paramilitary organization that would be able to use violence or threat of violence in support of his political goals (Mandiza, 2002). So, he created the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP).  The MYP was a heavily politicized organization, with strong paramilitary functions. It was subordinate to the president alone. “Its main purpose was to ensure that everyone conformed to party policy” (Mandiza, 2002). Thus, the MYP can be said to have been a type of a national military organization, shaped almost exclusively by a societal imperative, and subject to purely subjective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). Consequently, the MYP had a lot in common with Hitler’s SS. After all, the SS was also a heavily politicized, paramilitary organization, aimed at enforcing the will of the Nazi party (Wegner, 1990). And just like the MYP, the SS was also given official status and expanded, out of dissatisfaction with the political position of the official state military, which initially did not wish to participate in politics, and later became opposed to adventurous, aggressive foreign policies pursued by the Nazi government (Huntington, 1957).

The early, post-colonial situation in the neighbouring Mozambique also poses no problems for Western theories of civil-military relations. The military of post-colonial Mozambique was exactly the same organization that earlier constituted the armed wing of the liberation movement (i.e. the war of independence that led to the end of colonial rule). Similar to Malawi, the early, post-colonial government of Mozambique desired political support from an organization capable of using violence or threats of violence on its behalf (Macaringue, 2002). However, Mozambique’s post-colonial military, despite having strong political commitments during the war of independence, apparently had little interest in political involvement. Consequently, the government decided to forcibly shape the military by a societal imperative, and bring it under subjective civilian control. This was done by a “combination of penetration by the party, political education and the provision of substantial resources” (Macaringue, 2002). Not surprisingly, the Nazi government used very similar tactics (in addition to others) to convert the uncooperative German military to the Nazi point of view and make them more obedient in executing Nazi policies (Huntington, 1957).   

References

Huntington, S. P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp. 1-4, 80-97, 98-141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macaringue, P. (2002). “Civil-military relations in post-Cold War Mozambique.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 137-151). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Macaringue.pdf.

Mandiza, E. I. (2002). “Civil-military relations in Malawi: An historical perspective.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 107-134). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Mandiza.pdf.  

Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS: Organization, ideology, and function. Oxford: Blackwell.

What value does the concept of strategic culture add to the study of Civil-Military Relations?

Snyder (1977) suggests that the knowledge of a particular strategic culture allows one to better predict the behaviour and strategic decision making, which can be expected from strategists heavily influenced by that strategic culture. More specifically, for example, pre-existing strategic notions, present within a particular culture, can heavily influence the organizational and doctrinal adaptations to new technologies, in that culture. Moreover, because strategic culture, like any other type of culture, changes overtime; the notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes, certain states willingly engaged in military interventions into other states, during some historical periods but not during others (Katzenstein, 1996). Similarly, choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines can be better explained by examining the cultural environment of the relevant policy makers (Kier, 1996). 

Also, according to Kier (1996), the notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why different military organizations differ in their views of the world and their views on how they should conduct their missions in it. After all, the unique organizational culture of every military organization strongly influences what this military organization will perceive to be in its interest.

So, how do these ideas play out in practice?

The strategic culture, of the US during the Cold War, seems to provide a good example. In effect, this strategic culture was started by one intellectual, and due to favourable political circumstances, quickly spread, and came to influence all of US strategic thinking throughout the Cold War.  Thus, in 1946, an expert on military affairs, named Bernard Brodie, concluded that the invention of nuclear weapons made war impermissible. So, he thought that the new military strategy could only consist of the prevention of war through the threat of force – an idea which came to be called the deterrence doctrine (Bacevich, 2005). This idea clearly produced a whole new strategic culture. After all, it led to the creation of a new profession, whose practitioners came to be called defense intellectuals. And it led to the creation of new, highly influential institutions, such as the RAND Corporation. Not surprisingly, the defense intellectuals working in these institutions produced a vast body of highly influential literature, largely focused on various aspects of Brodie’s deterrence strategy (Bacevich, 2005). Finally, it seems reasonable to believe that a strategic idea, which was incorrect, would be quickly discarded, unless it gave rise to a whole strategic culture. If so, then Brodie’s deterrence strategy did indeed give rise to a new strategic culture, because even after the battlefields of the 1950s and 1960s proved that Brodie was wrong, the defense intellectuals continued to pretend otherwise and to work on various aspects of strategy, which still assumed that non-nuclear war is no longer possible, or at least, is of little consequence (Bacevich, 2005).    

References

Bacevich, A. J. (2005). The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katzenstein, P., (ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 1-78). New York: Columbia University Press.

Kier, E. (1996). “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II.” In: P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 186-215). New York: Columbia University Press.

Snyder, J. L. (1977). The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Available at http://bit.ly/1hKoWGH.

Does the military have a right to be different from, or a need to be reflective of, the society which it serves?

According to Max Weber, the armed forces can be most effective only when the rational, functional discipline of the military (which would stem from its organizational objectives) overrides the military professional’s identification with and loyalties to the civilian society. Consequently, Weber thought that this military discipline should erase the civilian habits of behaviour in recruits while turning them into soldiers (Rosen, 1996). Thus, Max Weber was clearly of the view that the military not only has the right to be different from the civilian society; but it actually should be different from the civilian society, and can only get harmed by attempting to reflect it in any way. However, perhaps Weber’s, just described, statements on the matter, were too broad, and would prove to be inappropriate, or at least, too simplistic, when one starts to analyse specific aspects of the military profession.

Thus, according to Ficarrotta (1997), if the armed forces are to effectively perform their function, military professionals should both be bound by special moral obligations not binding on civilians, and strictly follow all those moral obligations that apply to civilians. Hence, based on this line of thought, at least when it comes to its morals, the military clearly has the right to be different from the civilian part of society, even though civilian morals should form an important part of the military moral code.

However, according to Ficarrotta (1997), there are reasons to believe that the effectiveness of the armed forces will not suffer if military professionals who follow all moral obligations, required of a military professional, on duty, do not follow some or all of these moral obligations while off duty. This suggests that the military has the right to and should be morally different from the civilian society, while it is performing its functions. However, the people, who collectively form the armed forces, need not be morally different from civilians, whenever they aren’t functioning as part of the armed forces.

On the other hand, according to Ficarrotta (1997), it is possible that if military professionals always follow their professional military obligations in all contexts, the moral image of the military, in the eyes of the public, will be higher; which will contribute to a greater support for the military by the public. Also, highly moral soldiers are more likely to go above and beyond the call of duty if they believe that their military leaders are exceptionally moral. Hence, these arguments suggest that military professionals should follow the military moral code both while they are on duty and while they are off duty in their civilian roles; suggesting that all component parts of the military have the right to and should be morally different from the civilian society which they serve, in all cases.

References

Ficarrotta, J. C. (1997). “Are Military Professionals Bound by a Higher Moral Standard?” Armed Forces and Society, 24(1): 59-75.

Rosen, S. P. (1996). Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies (pp. 1-32). Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press.

Do Civil-Military Relations (CMR) constitute a partnership?

According to Feaver (2003), CMR is clearly not a partnership. Instead it is a hierarchical relationship, involving strategic interaction, in which civilians hire the military to protect their society from enemies. Hence, according to Feaver (2003), CMR is just one variety of a common employer-employee relationship, which is called the principal-agent framework by the economists. This type of a relationship carries a number of challenging problems for the participants, and, as a result, is characterized by strategic interaction. For example, the employer wants to hire a diligent worker. However, every not-so-diligent worker wants to get hired, and hence will go to great lengths to present himself as being very diligent, during the selection process. Also, every employer wants to get the most amount of work for the least amount of pay, out of his/her employee; while every employee wants to be paid the largest amount of money for doing the least amount of work. Hence, the interests of the civilian employer and the military employee are in direct opposition. This leads to both sides constantly attempting to fool one another; while simultaneously demanding more from each other, and attempting to force each other to keep all promises (Feaver, 2003).      

On the other hand, Bland (1999) apparently believes that CMR is a partnership. In fact, according to him, civilian leaders and military officers share responsibility for the civilian control of the military. Specifically, both groups of leaders are responsible and accountable for their respective aspects of civilian control over the military. Bland (1999) supports this idea by asserting that empirical evidence on CMR demonstrates that military experts, not only direct military operations and provide technical advice to civilian leaders; but they also assist civilian leaders in controlling the armed forces. Moreover, even in mature liberal democracies, military leaders are expected to engage in joint decision-making with civilian leaders, regarding national defense and the use of armed forces (Bland, 1999).

At least when it comes to the CMR in the modern United States, I am inclined to side with Bland (1999), rather than Feaver (2003), because I agree with Mills (1956). Mills sees three dominant sources of power over the modern US: the political order, the military order, and the economy (dominated by several hundred huge, interrelated corporations). And according to him, the decisions taken by the US military, both rest upon and have a serious effect on the political life of the US and its economy. Moreover, Mills (1956) argues that American generals and admirals hold positions of decisive political and economic relevance, and have many interests in common with the political leaders of the visible government and the corporate rich. All of this suggests that CMR is an egalitarian, collaborative relationship between the military and the two types of civilian leaders.

References

Bland, D. L. (1999). “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces and Society, 26(1): 7-26.

Feaver, P. (2003). Armed Servants (pp. 54-117). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Are the two imperatives of the armed forces actually all that different?

The two imperatives of the armed forces do appear to be very different. For a start, their sources are completely different. While the functional imperative stems from the threats to the society’s security; it is the various ideologies, social forces, and the institutions dominant within the society, that determine the societal imperative (Huntington, 1957). Moreover, if the two imperatives were similar, it would seem reasonable to expect there to be societies whose military institutions have been shaped by only one of these imperatives. However, there is no evidence of such societies; and there are good reasons for that. In fact, military institutions, which are shaped only by social values, are unlikely to be capable of effectively dealing with threats to the society’s security. Similarly, military institutions that have been shaped only by functional imperatives are unlikely to remain stable within, and cooperate with, any civilian society (Huntington, 1957). 

It is interesting to note that the armed forces have persistently intervened in the politics of many different countries of the past and present. And their interventions were usually decisive and led to the establishment of military rule in those countries (Finer, 1962). These phenomena may indicate multiple instances of armed forces shaped primarily by the functional imperative; whether because the political intervention was carried out because the civilian authorities were seen as being incapable of securing the society, or because the various ideologies, social forces, and the institutions dominant within the society were deemed inappropriate by the military, which desired to change them in accordance with its vision.

But why should the armed forces be at risk of having social values that are different from the larger society? Don’t all members of the military get inculcated with civilian social values long before they join the military? First, unlike many forms of civilian organization, the military is a purposive instrument, rationally conceived and aimed at fulfilling certain objectives – in particular, fighting and winning wars (Finer, 1962). Second, to help fulfill this purpose, every military has five main features: (1) It has a centralized command. (2) It is hierarchically organized. (3) All of its members are subject to discipline. (4) It is connected by its own communication network. (5) It has its own, unique, epirit de corps, with its corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency of the military. These five features make the armed forces much more highly organized, and hence distinct, from any civilian organizations; while its fifth feature - epirit de corps – imparts and sustains in military professionals uniquely military social values, which may even lead to contempt for civilians (Finer, 1962).

References

Finer, S. E. (1962). The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (pp. 1-22). London: Pinter.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). “Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military Relations.” In: S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp. 1-4). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

How has the political evolution of the state influenced the role of the armed forces?

Political evolution of human societies gradually led to the emergence of states. The first states were necessarily agrarian, and according to Mann (1993), agrarian states used at least ¾ of their revenue to fund wars. So, as a result, their military personnel greatly outnumbered their civilian officials and made state-societies look like war-making machines.

Mann’s (1986) analysis of power suggests that the emergence of what he classifies as authoritative, intensive form of power (i.e. concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized) in the armed forces (where such form of power was clearly very useful) likely led to its widespread adoption by the states; in no small measure because the armies which were ruled by this form of power proved to be superior to others, and thus strengthened their parent states. Thus, it can be argued, based on Mann’s (1986) analysis, that the evolution of armed forces influenced the political role and functions of the state, not just the other way around. In addition, according to Mann (1993), many radical changes in the political structure and role of the state (i.e. revolutions) would not have taken place without the assistance of military factions, whose vision of their role in society, it can be argued, has, at that time, changed toward a more radical position.

According to Mann (1993), the emergence of modern states led to the formal monopolization of military violence by these states. But instead of ending the autonomy of military power, this change led to the redirection of military power through state’s formal organizations.  Thus, rapid political evolution of European states during early modern period led, by the 18^th century, to the centralization of the military under a high command, which in turn, fell under the formal control of the state’s chief executive. Also, the start of the Second Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 19^th century turned militaries into customers of industrial capitalism (Mann, 1993). At the same time, these developments can be linked to Mann’s (1993) observation of those militaries developing technocratic self-confidence, and to their skills becoming removed from everyday controls and social practices. All of this, in turn, may have led to what Mann (1993) describes as militaries becoming insulated, caste-like, within the state, developing segmental discipline over their mass armies, and starting to recruit their lower ranks from lower social classes (Mann, 1993).

It can be argued, based on Mann’s (1993) analysis, that the political evolution of the state gradually led to the near autonomy in actual function (despite formal integration) of various branches of the modern state. Given this, it should not be surprising that during the later years of the Cold War, the military could act autonomously and terminate the state and even the world, as Mann (1993) argues it could.

References

Mann, M. (1986). “Societies as organized power networks.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume I: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 (pp.1-33). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1kwZELI.

Mann, M. (1993). “A theory of the modern state.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume II: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914 (pp. 44-91). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1mbDKh7.